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Between Perception and Action 
By BENCE NANAY 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 224 pp. £30.00 (hbk) 
 
What mental states or processes mediate between perception and action? Bence Nanay’s lucid and 
provocative monograph argues that the most important mediating states are pragmatic representations (PRs) – 
perceptual states representing the properties required to successfully act upon an object. After introducing 
PRs (ch.1), Nanay argues that they are genuine perceptual states and necessary antecedents of most actions 
(ch.2), discusses the kinds of properties that can be attributed by PRs and the objects to which our perceptual 
systems attribute them (ch.3), and argues that construing PRs as necessary antecedents of action both affords 
a way of naturalizing action theory and dethrones propositional attitude psychology as the default mode of 
explaining intentional actions (ch.4). Chapter 5 considers the attribution of action-relevant properties via 
mental imagery rather than perception, using the ensuing category of pragmatic mental imagery to ground new 
explanations of pretense actions and some of the semi-automatic, imperfectly rational, activities often 
understood via appeal to ‘aliefs’ (Gendler 2008). Chapter 6 introduces the notion of vicarious perception – the 
perceptual attribution of properties pertaining to the possible actions of another agent – and argues 
convincingly that a wide range of empirical and theoretical questions about infant and animal understanding 
of the mental states of others can be productively recast in light of this notion. Taken as a whole, the chapters 
are intended to provide a new theoretical framework for investigating how sophisticated cognitive abilities 
such as action-planning, imagination, deliberation and interpersonal understanding could be rooted in 
sensorimotor capacities that we share with infants and animals. As this summary suggests, Nanay’s short 
book packs in much for philosophers of mind and action to engage with, and each chapter opens many 
avenues for further exploration and debate. I restrict myself here to raising, in constructive spirit, some 
questions about his central claim – that PRs are perceptual states that represent the properties of objects 
required for particular actions, and are necessary antecedents of most actions.  
 
Why think that PRs are perceptual states? A natural thought (22) is that actions require perceptual states as 
their antecedents so that they can be guided by the worldly circumstances to which they are responses. But 
this leaves open the possibility that perception here serves as input to non-perceptual states that guide action 
– perhaps motor planning, or representations of target kinesthetic or sensory states. Here Nanay appeals to a 
fact about perceptual learning: when wearing goggles that distort the way the world appears (e.g. by shifting 
the visual field leftward), perceivers quickly regain the ability to throw a ball through a hoop while their 
perceptual experience remains distorted. Nanay suggests (25) that this is only explicable by attributing an 
unconscious perceptual state to the subject that accurately represents the hoop’s location. Granting this, 
Nanay argues, undercuts support for the view that the true antecedent state of this action is non-perceptual, 
since holding this would require attributing a further non-conscious state to the subject – one to which the 
unconscious perceptual state serves as input. Plausibly, we should not attribute non-conscious 
representational states to subjects without good reason; Nanay’s proposal (reasonably) attributes only one, 
whereas the rival interpretation attributes two. One response here is to wonder whether such questions can 
really be settled from the armchair – shouldn’t this dispute be adjudicated with respect to our current best 
psychological theories of perceptual learning and motor control? Perhaps more importantly, we might 
question whether the regained ability is only explicable via appeal to an updated perceptual representation of 
the hoop’s location. Why not hold that the perceptual state remains unchanged, while the relationship 
between it and the states and processes involved in motor planning and execution adapts? Of course, such a 
proposal must explain exactly how that relationship is changed through perceptual learning (and why that 
relationship is distorted in the cases of various action-resistant optical illusions, such as the two-dimensional 
Ebbinghaus illusion (26)). But Nanay’s proposal faces the parallel challenge of explaining exactly how the 
non-conscious perceptual state that guides adapted action is updated through perceptual learning (and why 
there is a mismatch between conscious and non-conscious perceptual representations in cases of action-
resistant illusion). 
 
Secondly, must we think of the states or processes that mediate between perception and action as 
representational? Here Nanay diplomatically suggests that readers tempted by an anti-representationalist 
framework for understanding the mind might recast most of the book’s claims in relational terms. Where 
Nanay speaks of the properties objects must be represented as having in order to perform particular actions, 
anti-representationalists may think instead of the properties to which perceivers must be related in order to 
perform those actions. Nanay is right to suspect that some of his readership – philosophers interested in de-
intellectualizing the mind via appeal to sensorimotor relationships – will harbour anti-representationalist 
sympathies, but the extent to which his framework could be recast in relational terms is unclear. Take, for 
instance, the last part of his central claim – that PRs are necessary antecedents of most actions. Nanay’s chief 
reason for this claim seems to be one we met above – that ‘without such representations we would not be 
able to explain our fine-grained movements (for example in the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion or in 
the basketball example)’ (69). However, it is not clear why representing action-relevant properties is necessary 
here. What seems trivially true is that we must be appropriately related to the relevant properties of the object 
in order to act upon it. But the question of whether this relation must be representational apparently 
remains open. Here, then, is one place where the possibility of a relational view threatens to undermine part 
of Nanay’s central claim. The contention that PRs are necessary antecedents of most actions also appears 
threatened by the limits Nanay candidly places on its scope. Throughout, Nanay is admirably careful about 
qualifying his central claims, and acknowledging cases or consequences about which he is unsure. He clarifies 
(28-31) that PRs are not required for mental actions, simple yet non-reflex actions such as blinking or 
swallowing, or complex actions composed of simpler actions. He is committed only to the claim that PRs are 
necessary antecedents of actions whose immediate mental antecedent has a representational component, and 
suggests that the foregoing action types fail this criterion. On Nanay’s view, ‘The immediate mental 
antecedents of action are what make actions genuine actions’ (3). The framework Nanay presents thus 
appears to rule out the desirable possibility of a unified theory of why blinking, thinking and (visually-guided) 
drinking all qualify as actions. 
 
While the above remarks have been mildly critical, Between Perception and Action has much to recommend it. 
It engages a wide range of contemporary philosophical and empirical literature and offers an original and 
fertile perspective from which to understand much of our mental lives. In particular, the final chapters 
applying Nanay’s framework to mental imagery and social cognition break important new ground, and 
constitute one of the most sophisticated discussions to date of how higher cognitive abilities might be 
grounded in sensorimotor capacities. The book is an important contribution to philosophical research on 
the relationship between perception, agency and cognition, and deserves the attention of any theorist 
working on these issues. 
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